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Since the normalization of the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and China in 1992, 
there has been an active interaction between the two countries which goes beyond differences in 
political, economic, social, and cultural systems. The astonishing growth in South Korea-China 
relations, however, has also increased areas in which conflict and clash may occur. In particular, the 
socio-cultural interaction between the two countries has created new identities, images, ideas and 
discourses, subsequently increasing the areas of conflict and clash. Based on Appadurai’s discussion 
of the transnational interaction in the globalization process, the present paper analyzes the socio-
cultural relationship between South Korea and China, focusing on ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and 
ideoscapes, which are especially important in looking at socio-cultural dimensions. 
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Since the normalization of the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and China in 
1992, there has been an active transnational interaction between the two countries which 
goes beyond differences in political, economic, social, and cultural systems. The astounding 
development in South Korea-China relationship over the past twenty years has thus involved 
all areas encompassing economic, political, social and cultural interactions. One 
representative example of this active interaction is the growth in trade between the two 
countries. In 1992, South Korea’s export to China was 2.65 billion U.S. Dollars (hereafter 
USD) and its trade volume with China was 6.38 billion USD, which was approximately 3.5% 
of South Korea’s total export and 4.0% of gross trade volume, respectively. However, in 
2011, South Korea’s export to China increased 51 times to 134.18 billion USD and trade 
volume with China 35 times to 220.6 billion USD, taking up 24.2% of South Korea’s total 
export and 20.4% of gross trade volume, respectively. Thus, as of 2011, South Korea’s trade 
volume with China is larger than that with the U.S. (100.78 billion USD) and Japan (108 
billion USD) combined, and the total export to China is not only larger than that to U.S. 
(56.2 billion USD) or to Japan (39.68 billion USD) but similar to that to U.S, Japan, and EU 
(55.7 billion USD) combined.1  
South Korea has also become a very important trade partner to China. As of 2011, South 
Korea is China’s third largest trading country in terms of gross trade volume, following the 
U.S. and Japan. South Korea’s FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) to China has also grown 
from 223 million USD in 1992 to 7.345 billion USD in 2007. The amount decreased due to 
                                                          
1 According to the Chinese government, China’s gross trade volume with South Korea is 245.6 billion 
USD in 2011. However, this paper uses the figures from Trade Statistics provided by Korean 
International Trade Association. 
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the global financial crisis but has regained growth afterwards, and as of 2011, is recorded at 
4.874 billion USD.2  
South Korea and China have also forged a close relationship in the diplomatic sphere, as 
exhibited in the two countries’ cooperation surrounding North Korea’s nuclear issue. 
Reflecting the development of political relations, the cooperation between South Korea and 
China has deepened from a “friendly cooperative relationship” at the beginning of the 
normalization of diplomatic relationship to the present “strategic cooperative partnership,” an 
expression used for one of the most distinguished types of bilateral relationship in Chinese 
foreign policy (Kim, 2009). 
In addition to the economic and political interaction, the socio-cultural interaction 
between the two countries has also been active. In 2011, more than 6.4 million have travelled 
between the two countries, which is a 50-times increase from 130,000 in 1992. The exchange 
in students have been particularly vibrant, with 62,957 South Korean students in China and 
59,317 Chinese students in South Korea in 2011, recording the largest portion of 
international students in each others’ country respectively. The rapid development of the 
bilateral relationship between the two countries in various areas since 1992 as such has led 
many scholars to make positive evaluations with expressions such as “dazzling 
development” (Cho, 2011:90), “rapid expansion” (Chung, 2011:19), “unbelievable, 
astounding growth” (Lee, D. 2008:227), and a “miracle in the diplomacy history” (Wang, 
2007:45). 
However, the astonishing growth in South Korea-China relations has also increased areas 
in which conflict and clash may occur, as well as the possibility of such unwelcome incidents 
due to the complexity and plurality of the two countries' interaction. Especially, the socio-
cultural interaction which transcends systemic, national, ethnic, and cultural borders between 
the two countries has created new identities, new images, and new ideas and discourses, and 
has subsequently increased the areas of conflict and clash. The present paper thus will look at 
the current state of socio-cultural interaction between South Korea and China and analyze the 
areas of the socio-cultural conflicts between the two countries.  
To this purpose, this paper will draw on Appadurai’s discussion, which focuses on the 
socio-cultural dynamics in transnational interaction in the era of globalization. Appadurai 
illuminated that the globalization process does not only occur in economic and political 
spheres in ways of the movement in international capital or the creation of international 
organizations, but also has various other affects which give birth to new identities through 
the transnational interaction of images and imagination. According to Appadurai, global 
cultural flows in the globalization process can be categorized largely into five dimensions, 
that is: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes. These five 
‘scapes’ refer to the respective dimensions of transnational interaction and interchange for 
people, machinery, money, images and information, and ideological ideas (Appadurai, 1996: 
33-36). Of these ‘scapes,’ the most important in terms of socio-cultural interaction are the 
ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes.  
The present paper therefore will analyze the social-cultural relationship between South 
Korea and China after the normalization of diplomatic relationship in 1992 with a focus on 
                                                          
2 The numbers above are figures based on investors’ reports to the South Korean government. In terms 
of real figure, South Korea’s FDI to China was 140 million USD in 1992, 5.268 billion USD in 2007, 
and 3.572 billion USD in 2011. Refer to Foreign Invest Statistics (By Country) provided by Korea 
Exim Bank. 




ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes, among the five dimensions presented by 
Appadurai. First, the status of the socio-cultural interaction between South Korea and China 
which has been showing rapid growth since 1992 will be presented in terms of the three 
'scapes,' followed by the content of the conflict and clash found in these dimensions. Lastly, 




2. SOCIO-CULTURAL INTERACTION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA 
 
2.1. Interactions in Ethnoscapes 
 
In ethnoscapes, the landscape related to flows of people such as tourists, immigrants, 
refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals who constitute an 
essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations 
(Appadurai, 1996:33), there has been a significant growth between South Korea and China 
since 1992. As the 837 weekly flights over 52 air routes between South Korea and China as 
of August 2012 exhibit, the population exchange between the two countries has grown 
enormously since 1992, when the number of population moving between the two countries 
was recorded at a mere 130,000. The last twenty years have greatly increased population 
movement, the number of which reached an astounding 6.4 million (6.7 million including 
flight attendants) in 2011, 50 times larger than that of 1992, and continual growth is expected 
to open an era in which more than 10 million people move between the two countries. With 
the great increase in population exchange in ethnoscapes, the number of South Korean 
consulates in China has been increased to ten offices including the one in Dalian which is 
scheduled to open soon. This number is the same as the number of South Korean consulates 
in Japan as well as that in the U.S., with whom diplomatic relationship was formed in 1965 
and 1882, respectively. The population exchange in ethnoscapes can be divided into the 
movement from South Korea to China and that from China to South Korea.  
First, to look at the movement from South Korea to China, the number of South Koreans 
visiting China for reasons of tourism, study abroad, and business has shown a steady annual 
increase since 1992. In 1992, the number of South Korean visitors to China was only 43,234 
but the number recorded 4,185,000 (4,300,000 including flight attendants) in 2011. In the 
same year, the portion of South Koreans visiting China was 33% of all South Koreans going 
overseas, which means that one in three South Koreans going abroad had their destination as 
China. This number is almost a million South Koreans more than the number of South 
Koreans who went abroad to the U.S., Japan, and Europe combined (Korea Tourism 
Organization, 2012).  
In particular, the number of South Korean students studying in China has greatly 
increased since 1992, and record shows that in 2011, there were 62,957 South Korean 
students, the largest portion amongst international students in China.3 Although there were 
bouts of decrease in the number of South Koreans in China due to the 2008 global financial 
crisis and subsequent downturn in economy, as South Korea and China’s economies 
recovered relatively fast from the crisis, the number of population exchange gained back its 
                                                          
3 Refer to International Student Statistics provided by Statistics Korea. According to China’s Ministry 
of Education, in 2011, the number of South Korean students in China is 62,442 (Hao, 2012). 
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growing trend once again. As a result, today, the number of South Koreans residing in China, 
excluding ethic Korean Chinese, is estimated to be approximately 800,000 people, the largest 
among all foreigners in China.4 
With the rise of China, the growth in visitors to China is not a trend exclusive to South 
Korea alone. However, the exceptional characteristic of South Koreans in ethnoscapes is that 
South Koreans have formed new spaces in major cities of China - concentrated settlements 
or Koreatowns (韩国城 hanguocheng) - unlike other foreigners. Koreatowns have emerged 
from the inflow of South Koreans not only in China's large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Shenyang, but also in the Shandong province which has geographic 
proximity to and historical affinity with South Korea. Beijing’s Wangjing and Wudaokou 
areas, Shanghai’s Gubei area, Shenyang’s Xita area, Qingdao’s Chengyangqu area are some 
of the representative Koreatowns in China (Paik et al., 2010). Although there are also 
concentrated residential areas in China formed by foreigners of other nationalities as well, 
such as the area inhabited by Germans around Kempinski Hotel in Beijing, these 
concentrated residential areas are merely areas where people of the same nationality live in 
close quarters and without an organic relationship amongst the residents. By contrast, 
Koreatowns formed by South Koreans in China have developed into transnational ethnic 
communities centered on ethnic economies (Jeong, 2012). Thus, Koreatowns in major 
Chinese cities separate itself from those formed by foreigners of other nationalities and 
exhibit a characteristic exclusive to South Koreans.5  
The formation of a South Korean society in China based on the rapid growth in 
ethnoscapes has also led to the development of civic organizations for South Koreans in 
China. Various forms of civic organizations have emerged in Koreatowns and have expanded 
their influence to larger scopes beyond the Koreatown districts. Most notable are the ‘Korean 
Community China,’ the largest civic organization for South Koreans in China, and the 
‘Korea Chamber of Commerce in China’, mainly composed of China branch managers of 
South Korean conglomerates and large-scale businessmen.6 In addition, there also exist other 
types of organizations such as alumni associations formed by long-term immigrants and 
students, South Korean religious groups, and associations among various types of South 
Korean businessmen. These groups have brought new types of transnational South Korean 
communities in China, providing what Appadurai termed as diasporic public spheres 
(Appadurai, 1996:21-22).   
In parallel to the movement of South Koreans to China, the number of population 
movement from China to South Korea in ethnoscapes has also been increasing steadily since 
                                                          
4 This number is provided by the ‘Korean Community China’, the largest civil organization of South 
Koreans in China. However, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in China estimates the number of 
South Koreans in China as being largely from 370,000 to 850,000 as of 7 August 2012. On the other 
hand, Chinese newspaper, Huanqiu Ribao, reports that there were 14 Chinese cities with more than 
10,000 South Korean residents and more than a million South Koreans residing in China (Yu, 2009). 
5  The Taiwanese have also formed concentrated settlements in major Chinese cities which are 
transnational ethnic communities centering on ethnic economies (Deng, 2006). However, considering 
that Taiwanese are ethnically Chinese, the concentrated settlements based on ethnic economies 
formed by South Koreans as foreigners can be considered exceptional. 
6 In particular, the Korean Community China has expanded to a nation-wide scale to cover all of China 
by increasing the number of local branches from 16 to 57. Interview with the chief-director of the 
Korean Community China, Beijing, 22 July 2010. 




1992. The number of Chinese visitors to South Korea has increased from 45,187 in 1992 to 
2,220,000 (2,400,000 including flight attendants) in 2011, which takes up 23.5% of all 
foreigners visiting South Korea (Korea Tourism Organization, 2012). This number is 
expected to reach three million within the year and over ten million by 2020. With the rapid 
increase in Chinese visitors to South Korea, the annual number of visas issued to Chinese 
nationals by the South Korean authorities was recorded to be more than one million for the 
first time in 2011. Excluding Hong Kong and Macau, South Korea was the most popular 
destination amongst Chinese in the same year. In particular, the number of Chinese students 
coming to South Korea to study has increased greatly. Whereas there were only 17 Chinese 
students in South Korea in 1992, the number increased to more than 10,000 in 2005 and to 
59,317 in 2011 which takes up 66.2% of the 89,537 international students in South Korea 
(National Institute for International Education, 2012). Even when the exchange students and 
language students are excluded from the numbers, the number of Chinese students studying 
towards a degree has grown from 278 in 1995 to 46,378 in 2011, which is 72.9% of all 
international students studying towards a degree in South Korea.7   
The exceptional number of incoming population from China has made the Chinese the 
most important group of foreigners for South Korea. Of the 1,420,000 foreigners residing in 
South Korea in March 2012, Chinese take up 690,000 (of which ethnic Korean Chinese are 
about 480,000) and 50% of the all foreign residents in South Korea. The number of long-
term Chinese residents in South Korea is rapidly increasing as well. For instance, of the 
110,028 foreigners registered at the South Korean Immigration Service under the Ministry of 
Justice in 1995, the number of Chinese was 19,192, which was only 17.4% of the total 
number of foreigners registered, but in 2011, the number of Chinese registered was 536,699 
out of a total of 982,461 registered foreigners, taking up a 54.6%.8 This rapid increase in the 
number of long-term Chinese residents in South Korea resulted in the emergence of the “new 
overseas Chinese (新华侨 xinhuaqiao),” composed of Chinese migrants from mainland China 
and distinct from the previous overseas Chinese. The new overseas Chinese have formed 
new concentrated settlements of their own, separate from existing Chinatowns, in areas such 
as Garibong-dong, Noyu-dong, and Daerim-dong in Seoul and Ansan in Gyeonggi-do. With 
the inflow of the new overseas Chinese, these areas have transformed from being residential 
and work areas of low-wage laborers during South Korea’s industrialization into 
concentrated (Korean) Chinese settlements. These new inhabitants have actively created 
various socio-cultural communities in South Korea.9  
As seen from above, the flow of population in ethnoscapes has made important 
contributions to the relationship between South Korea and China. Through ethnoscapes, 
China provided cheap but qualified labor to South Korea, while South Korea helped in 
                                                          
7 Refer to Education Statistics provided by Korean Educational Development Institute.  
8 Refer to Korea Immigration Service Statistics provided by Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Korea. 
9 The active population exchange in ethnoscapes since 1992 has also contributed to the redevelopment 
of existing Chinatowns. One example can be the Chinatown in Bukseong-dong, Incheon city, which 
was formed by Chinese traders who followed the Qing army during the Imogullan military uprising in 
1882. Afterwards, this Chinatown met a downturn as it experienced difficulties in economic activity 
through the course of the Korean War, currency reform, and the imposition of stricter regulations on 
their land ownership, but the increase in new overseas Chinese along with the rise of China has given 
it a second life. 
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adding vitalization to the Chinese market. More than anything, the transnational movement 
of students has made an important contribution in increasing socio-cultural understanding 
between the two countries.  
 
2.2. Interactions in Mediascapes 
 
South Korea and China have also experienced large-scale interaction in mediascapes 
which “refer both to the distribution of electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate 
information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, and film-production studios) ... and 
to the images of the world created by these media” (Appadurai, 1996:35). Most 
representative of the socio-cultural interaction in mediascapes are the Korean wave (韩流 
hanliu in Chinese and hallyu in Korean) in China and the China fever (汉风 hanfeng, 中国风 
Zhongguofeng, 中国热 Zhongguore) in South Korea.  
The Korean wave rose from the popularity of South Korea’s TV dramas, popular music, 
movies and films, and online games in China. With the rise of the Korean wave, the export 
of South Korean media contents to China achieved a steady increase. During the period from 
2008, when a K-pop boom hit China, to 2010, the average annual increase in the export value 
of South Korean media contents to China has been 35%, showing a jump from 400 million 
USD to 750 million USD (Park and Kim, 2012:4). Let’s look at the Korean wave in China by 
category.  
South Korean TV dramas started attracting the Chinese audience with “What is Love 
(Sarangi Mwogillae)” in 1997, succeeded by the very popular “A Wish Upon a Star 
(Byeoreun Nae Gaseume)” in 1999 and “A Jewel in the Palace (Daejanggeum)” in 2005, at 
which point the Korean wave in the TV drama industry found its peak (Gwak, 2005). 
Although the export of South Korean TV dramas to China decreased since 2006 due to the 
new regulations instated by the Chinese government on the import and broadcasting of 
foreign media contents, South Korean broadcasting contents export to China has shown a 
rise again after 2009, as the genres of contents in demand diversified to include variety 
shows and documentaries (Park and Kim, 2012:4). 
South Korean TV dramas themselves have also expanded in type, from melodramas and 
trendy dramas, to include family dramas as well through the popularity of “Famous Seven 
Princesses,” whose final episode broadcasted on Hunan satellite TV rated 20.17% and 
thereby renewed the record for highest rating among South Korean TV dramas in China 
which was previously held by “A Jewel in the Palace.” In addition, the popularity of “Full 
House” and “Temptation of Wife” in 2009 has led to an increase in South Korean drama 
remakes by Chinese productions, which has also been very popular as exemplified by the 
Chinese remake of “Temptation of Wife” which held the top position in ratings on Hunan 
satellite TV during its broadcast since the first airing in March 2011.  
K-pop also made a significant contribution to the Korean wave in China. The spread of 
South Korean popular music, exhibited by huge successes such as the 2000 H.O.T China 
Concert, established K-pop as a bona-fide musical genre in China, and K-pop fans are 
consuming South Korean popular music in real time through internet sites. The popularity of 
K-pop has lifted the export of South Korean music contents from 850,000 USD in 2006 to 
3,630,000 USD in 2010, a 4-times increase over the five-year period (Park and Kim, 2012:5). 
K-pop not only exerted its influence in terms of music, but also in the lifestyle and fashions 
of its avid Chinese followers, especially the young generation. These Chinese fans embraced 
the culture represented by the South Korean singers into their daily lives by imitating their 




fashion and hairstyle, a phenomenon which attracted broad attention by the media. The 
Korean wave led by K-pop even resulted in the formation of hahanzu (哈韩族) – a group of 
young Chinese people who are deeply interested and immersed in Korean culture – and 
contributed much in creating a positive image of South Korea to the Chinese population. 
In terms of South Korean movies, although the limit on the number of foreign films 
allowed in national theatres imposed by the Chinese government continue to be an obstacle, 
South Korean films also boast wide popularity through unofficial channels. At the same time, 
there has been an increase in South Korea-China joint film productions and the appearance 
of South Korean actors in Chinese films, all of which have contributed to the expansion of 
the Korean wave. Online games are also contributing to the inflow of South Korean cultural 
contents into China, with the export value growing 3.8 times from 160 million USD in 2008 
to approximately 600 million USD in 2010 (Park and Kim, 2012:5).  
Like the Korean wave in China, the interest in China gave birth to the China fever in 
South Korea. The China fever first appeared in the form of heated enthusiasm towards 
learning Chinese and studying abroad in China. For example, the number of South Koreans 
taking the Chinese efficiency test, HSK, increased from 487 people in 1993, when it was first 
held in South Korea, to 53,000 people in 2010. In the same year, it was estimated that more 
than half of the population taking the test, which was held 292 places in 70 countries around 
the world, were South Koreans (Education Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic 
of China in Korea, 2012; Shin, 2011). The heightened interest in learning Chinese amongst 
South Koreans can also be evidenced by the number of students choosing Chinese as their 
second language in high-schools, which has also increased drastically from 43,942 in 1992 to 
199,816 in 2011.10 
With the rise of China, the China fever, which was mainly centered on learning Chinese 
language or studying abroad in China, evolved into an overall interest in Chinese culture 
amongst South Koreans. Responding such change in trend, the first Confucius Institute (孔子
学院 Kongzi xueyuan), the overseas agency for promoting Chinese language and Chinese 
culture, was established in Seoul in November 2004, and has since then established a total of 
19 Confucius Institutes in South Korea as of 2011. These Institutes not only train Chinese 
language teachers but also run various programs such as study abroad preparation classes, 
Chinese culture classes, Chinese language competitions, cultivating pro-Chinese population 
in South Korea.  
One significant result of the China fever in South Korea is the speedy increase in the 
number of China-related departments established in universities. In 1991, the year before the 
normalization of diplomatic relationship, there were only 61 China-related departments in 
four-year universities, most of which were departments of Chinese language and literature, 
but at present in 2012, there are 140 departments including 61 departments of China area 
studies that comprehensively deal with China.11 The surge in China-related departments in 
universities reflect the evolution of the China fever in South Korea from learning Chinese 
language or studying abroad in China to an overall interest in Chinese culture and society.  
The gradual expansion of shared cultural images in mediascapes between South Korea 
and China, represented by the Korean wave and the China fever, has contributed greatly to 
                                                          
10 Refer to Education Statistics provided by Korean Educational Development Institute. 
11  Refer to Education Statistics provided by Korean Educational Development Institute. When 
including specialized colleges, the number of China-related departments is about 208 at present in 
2012. 
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the deepening of socio-cultural understanding between the two countries. The Korean wave, 
which became a cultural phenomenon in China, functioned as a medium through which 
Chinese people formed their images and perception of South Korea. By consuming and 
enjoying South Korean TV dramas, pop music, and movies, Chinese people have been able 
to increase their understanding of and identification with South Korea. In other words, by 
becoming an opening through which the Chinese gained an understanding of South Korean 
society, the Korean wave contributed in forging a tighter South Korea-China relationship by 
building a stronger sense of cultural affinity towards South Korea in its Chinese audiences 
(Zhang, 2006).  
Like the Korean wave, the China fever in South Korea which sparked from a renewed 
interest in China after 1992 has also played a significant role in enhancing South Koreans’ 
perception and understanding of China. With China’s rapid economic growth and rising 
status in the world order working as an additional factor to fuel South Koreans’ enthusiasm 
to learn more about China, the China fever continues to change South Koreans’ perception of 
China. Therefore, the China fever also has a substantial socio-cultural implication for the 
South Korea-China relationship.  
 
2.3. Interactions in Ideoscapes 
 
In ideoscapes, which refers to the concatenations of images closely related to the 
interaction and the reconstruction of ideological and counter-ideological ideas consisting 
elements of the Enlightenment world view such as freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, 
representation, and the master term democracy (Appadurai, 1996: 36),12 an interaction which 
was not possible before due to the differences in political system has occurred and expanded 
between South Korea and China.  
This interaction in ideoscapes accelerated through the flow in ethnoscapes, which 
allowed the exchange of discourses amongst opinion leaders such as scholars, journalists, 
and politicians. In particular, the exchange of students between the two countries has a very 
important significance. As Nye points out, many of the students who study abroad return to 
their home country after graduation and become opinion leaders, introducing and 
disseminating the values and ideologies of the countries in which they studied. Thus the 
exchange of international students has great significance in terms of ideoscapes (Nye, 2004: 
13). This situation also applies to South Korea-China interactions in ideoscapes. 
As an example, as of 28 November, 2012, the accumulated number of South Korean 
doctorate graduates who received their degree in China since 1992 has rapidly increased 
from only one to 1,176.13 Among these graduates, many are actively pursuing their careers in 
South Korea and became opinion leaders. The rise in recognition and status of Chinese 
doctorate degrees can be seen in the example of the doctorate graduates from China 
including Taiwan and Hong Kong who are currently professors at China-related departments 
in South Korea’s four-year universities. At present in 2012, there are 243 such professors 
who take up 25.1% of the total number of professors at China-related departments in South 
                                                          
12  According to Appadurai, mediascapes and ideoscapes are closely related landscapes of images 
(1996:35). 
13 This figure is from the number of South Korean doctorate graduates who received their degrees in 
China reported in the Foreign Doctorate Degree Registration System of the National Research 
Foundation of Korea, as of November 2012. 




Korea’s four-year universities. What is more is that, among these 243 professors, 54 
professors teach social science curriculums, which is 40.6% of the total number of social 
science professors at China-related departments in South Korea’s four-year universities.14  
The number of Chinese who received Ph. D. degrees in South Korea has also increased at 
a fast pace. There are currently no official figures for the number of Chinese doctorate 
graduates who received their Ph. D. degrees in South Korea, but when looking at the number 
of Chinese doctorate degree candidates registered in South Korean universities, the numbers 
are quite astonishing: the accumulated number of Chinese who registered in South Korean 
doctorate degree programs from January 2003 to November 2012 is 11,483. 15  These 
graduates are also active opinion leaders in China after graduation, among which a 
representative example can be the recent appointment of a Chinese doctoral graduate, who 
received his Ph. D. at the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National 
University, as the President of Yanbian University in China. 
The socio-cultural interaction in ideoscapes created the basis for mutual cooperation 
between South Korea and China and presents a possibility for the formation of discourse on 
important topics such as political democracy, economic development, and Asian values. In 
ideoscapes, South Korea provided discourses and experiences related to its strategy of 
economic development, method of rural development represented by Saemaul movement, 
and process of political democratization to China, while at the same time, China provided a 
practical possibility of constructing an alternative model for the U.S.-led world order 




3. SOCIO-CULTURAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA 
 
The socio-cultural interaction between South Korea and China, which developed rapidly 
since the reinstatement of South Korea-China relations in 1992, has contributed greatly in 
deepening the mutual understanding between the two countries. However, due to the 
difference in political systems, social situations, and cultural backgrounds, socio-cultural 
interactions between the two countries have at times also led to misunderstanding and 
conflict. As the actors of socio-cultural interaction between the two countries pluralized and 
diversified with the expansion in South Korea-China relations, the possibility of conflict and 
clash in the socio-cultural sphere has also shown respective growth. The following illustrates 
the socio-cultural conflicts in the three dimensions of ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and 
ideoscapes.    
 
3.1. Conflicts in Ethnoscapes 
 
The transnational movement of South Koreans into China often raises anti-Korean 
sentiments in China. Since South Koreans build tightly-knitted settlements centered on 
ethnic economies which take the form of Koreatowns in China’s major cities, Koreatowns 
                                                          
14 The figures on the doctorate graduates from China including Taiwan and Hong Kong who are 
currently professors at China-related departments in South Korea’s four-year universities are compiled 
from information on South Korean universities’ websites.  
15 Refer to Education Statistics provided by Korean Educational Development Institute. 
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are often the target and breeding-ground of anti-Korean sentiments felt by the Chinese. For 
Chinese residents living in or nearby Koreatowns, the loud noise made by their South Korean 
neighbors and the illegal status of many South Koreans living in Koreatowns are cited as 
major reasons for the negative image they have of South Koreans in China, while Chinese 
authorities point to the illegal missionary work by South Koreans to Chinese as a big reason. 
Not a small number of Chinese have a negative attitude towards Koreatowns in China’s 
major cities, for instance, more than twice the number of Chinese has answered “not 
welcome” rather than “welcome” to the question asking how they feel about incoming South 
Koreans to Beijing’s Wangjing area (Zhang, Piao, and Zheng, 2009:115). 
The active interaction between the two countries in ethnoscapes also inevitably brings out 
the conflict related to the ethic Korean Chinese. In particular, the interaction in ethnoscapes 
brought a huge transformation into the Korean Chinese society in China and resulted in a 
heated debate on the collapse of the Korean Chinese community. Korean Chinese refer to 
approximately two million ethnic Koreans who reside in China as Chinese citizens, 
belonging to one of China’s ethnic minorities (少数民族 shaoshu minzu). Many Koreans have 
migrated into northeast China since the start of the late nineteenth century, especially in 
present-day Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces, whose descendants became known 
as chaoxianzu in Chinese and joseonjok in Korean (Kim, 2010:3-4). From the time when 
they started migrating into China, Korean Chinese lived in concentrated settlements and 
remained in northeast China with limited spatial movement until the 1980s (Yoon, 2012: 
417). China’s economic reforms, however, spurred a change in the Korean Chinese 
community by propelling them to leave their traditional residences in three provinces of 
northeast China in search for higher-paying jobs. Especially, the huge inflow of South 
Koreans to China’s major cities since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992 
brought their ethnically-tied Korean Chinese into South Korean-concentrated neighborhoods 
in urban areas, causing a massive migration of Korean Chinese. 
At present, it is estimated that there are less than a million Korean Chinese in the three 
provinces of northeast China, while there is estimated to be about 500,000 in China’s major 
cities and 500,000 in South Korea and other foreign countries.16 Due to the large drain in 
population, the traditional settlements of Korean Chinese have found themselves in danger of 
disintegration. In particular, because so many have moved to South Korea and major urban 
areas in China following South Koreans who entered China after 1992, concerns have been 
raised about the dissolution of Korean Chinese families and the collapse of ethnic education, 
enforcing the sense of crisis felt by the Korean Chinese community. As a result, the inflow of 
South Koreans into China since 1992 have been underscored as the reason behind the 
disintegration of traditional Korean Chinese communities (Rui, 2009:1-4). 
The interaction between the two countries in ethnoscapes have also resulted in a serious 
conflict related to the Korean Chinese’s characteristics as kuajing minzu (跨境民族 meaning 
transnational ethnic group) of China with neighboring North and South Koreas as their ethnic 
homeland.17 The dual identity of Korean Chinese - the ethnic identity as Korean and the 
nationality (citizenship) as Chinese - has sometimes led to serious misunderstanding between 
                                                          
16 Statistics provided by Embassy of the Republic of Korea in China, 7 August 2012. 
17 Kuajing minzu (also called 跨界民族 kuajie minzu), a concept used for the ethnic minorities in China, 
refers to the ethnic minorities of Chinese nationality who reside in China, but who also have an 
independent ethnic state of their origin (homeland) along the border. For the concept of kuajing minzu, 
refer to Jin and Wang 1994. 




the two countries, while new areas of conflict have surfaced with the development of South 
Korea-China relations, notably between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. At the 
beginning of the normalization of diplomatic relationship between the two countries, there 
had formed a cooperative relationship between these two groups. This cooperative 
relationship, however, changed to a competitive and strained relationship as many Korean 
Chinese entered the businesses areas cultivated by South Korean businessmen - such as 
restaurants, real estate agencies, and tourist agencies - and became competitors against South 
Korean entrepreneurs. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, the tension deepened 
as many Korean Chinese took over enterprises formerly owned by South Koreans who were 
but to sell their businesses due to financial difficulties brought by the Korean won’s decline 
against the Chinese yuan. 
The population flow in ethnoscapes between South Korea and China has also led to 
problems surrounding illegal activities and the rights of transnational migrants. In 2011, the 
number of Chinese illegal migrants who reside in South Korea was estimated to be 67,034. 
Looking at Chinese illegal migration to South Korea more closely, separate trends can be 
found in that of Korean Chinese and of (non-Korean Chinese) Chinese migrants over the past 
decade. The number of Korean Chinese illegal migrants has increased from 22,128 in 1992 
to 58,705 in 2002, but with the instatement of immigration policies favorable to ethnic 
Koreans, the number started to decrease, to 17,284 in 2011.18 On the other hand, the number 
of (non-Korean Chinese) Chinese illegal migrants was only 736 in 1992, but has continually 
increased to reach 49,750 in 2011.19  
Criminal activity by South Koreans in China is also becoming a social problem. The 
problem with legality faced by South Koreans in China is as follows. First is the problem of 
rapid increase of illegal stay by South Koreans in China. According to the Chinese 
government, the number of South Korean illegal migrants in China is estimated to be almost 
20,000 in 2011. The number increased greatly in 2008 during the Beijing Olympic Games 
when there was a crackdown on illegal migrants and high rejection of short-term visas, 
which shows that the growth in the number of illegal South Korean migrants has a close 
relationship with the rigidity and vagueness of the Chinese government’s policy for the 
foreign residency. 
At the same time, some of the South Koreans in China, who fell to the lower end of the 
social ladder due to the social stratification in South Korean society in China spurred by 
China’s rapid economic development, have been involved in various criminal activities. 
According to Embassy of the Republic of Korea in China, many of the 394 cases of reported 
crimes by South Koreans in China in 2011 were related to the South Koreans in this social 
group.20 This new social group of South Koreans in China, like tailiu (台流) who have been 
identified as a social problem in the Taiwanese society in mainland China (Choi, 2008), has 
potential to taint South Korea’s image in China and to become a social problem. 
 
                                                          
18 An example can be the ‘Visit and Employment Programme (Bangmun chuieop jedo) for Ethnic 
Koreans with Foreign Citizenship’ in 2007, which allows free entry and departure from South Korea 
for five years and employment by any company in South Korea for three years to ethnic Koreans over 
the age of 25 (Seol and Skrentny, 2009). 
19 Refer to Korea Immigration Service Statistics provided by Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Korea. 
20 Statistics provided by Embassy of the Republic of Korea in China, 7 August 2012. 
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3.2. Conflicts in Mediascapes 
 
The interaction in mediascapes has also raised new socio-cultural conflicts between 
South Korea and China, especially as both countries actively use their cultural resources as a 
way to increase influence in each other’s country. As explained before, with the growing 
popularity of South Korean TV dramas and K-pop, the Korean wave began to spread in 
China amongst the general Chinese public. In the beginning, the South Korean government 
actively supported the spread of the Korean wave, not only for the sake of economic profit 
through the development of cultural industries, but also to achieve better performance of 
South Korea’s diplomatic policies by promoting the Korean cultural standard in Asia. In 
other words, the use of cultural resources through the Korean wave was an important element 
in South Korea’s soft power strategy (Lee, 2009). In fact, government agencies such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Korean Culture and Contents Agency, and the 
Korean National Tourism Office have pursued various projects towards the promotion of the 
Korean wave. Such efforts by the South Korean government came into conflict with China’s 
strategy to enforce its soft power through the use of its cultural resources, and resulted in a 
clash within mediascapes.  
China is also actively using its Chinese culture to increase its soft power. China’s efforts 
towards this end can be seen as an attempt to create a cultural standard through the revival 
and spread of the Chinese civilization in Asia (Cho, 2010:180). Evidence of such intention 
can be found in China’s response to the spread of the Korean wave in China. In the early 
years of the Korean wave, South Korean TV dramas were actively embraced by Chinese TV 
stations and other companies who faced fierce competition for new program contents, 
eagerly increasing their import of South Korean dramas, K-pop, and various other cultural 
products after their initial try at airing South Korean dramas gained success among Chinese 
audiences. The relatively cheap price of South Korean cultural contents also fueled the 
acceleration of the import growth. 
However, with the success of “Daejanggeum” in China in 2005, the minus effects 
resulting from the high popularity of South Korean drama series began to come into light 
through complaints from Chinese production companies who lost work because of the import 
of South Korean dramas. Responding to the general opinion demanding increased protection 
of the Chinese drama industry, Chinese government made various measures to bridle the 
import of foreign TV programs, including the “Notice on the strengthened law for imported 
foreign TV dramas” in 2002, “Regulations on import and broadcasting management of 
foreign TV programs” in 2004, and “Notice on the strengthened import and broadcasting 
management of foreign drama” in 2012. With the implementation of policies restricting 
import of foreign broadcasting contents, South Korean drama imports began to dive 
downwards from 2006. 
At the same time, the Korean wave has been often disparaged as a product of commercial 
capitalism and criticized as cultural invasion in China. In particular, just like the anti-Korean 
wave movement in Japan (嫌韩流) which looks down upon Korean culture, there emerged a 
Chinese anti-Korean wave movement (抗韩流 kanghanliu) to fight against the Korean wave 
and preserve China’s cultural domain among the Chinese working in media and 
entertainment industries as well as Chinese internet users. Chinese people were not happy 
with the drastic trade imbalance in cultural products between South Korea and China, and 
believed that this was only possible through the strong push of the South Korean government. 




As such, interactions in mediascapes between South Korea and China ended up in conflicts 
related to cultural nationalism (Leung, 2008). 
Another notable conflict that came about as the two countries started to actively use their 
cultural resources to their benefit is the “cultural origin” dispute, formed primarily amongst 
young internet users. Debates on the origins of various traditional cultures such as Dano (端
午 , Duanwu in China) festivals, printing press technology, Chinese characters, Chinese 
medicine, and Kimchi have spread through the internet in both countries and have become a 
conflict ground between the younger generations of the two countries. One clear example of 
such dispute is that on the Dano/Duanwu festival. Although both the Dano and Duanwu 
festivals are celebrated on the same day, the two festivals are particular to their respective 
countries and are distinct from each other in their contents. However, upon the registration of 
South Korea’s Gangneung Dano festival on the UNESCO cultural heritage list in 2005, a 
flood of criticism soon arose from many Chinese netizens who accused South Korea for 
hijacking their Chinese cultural heritage, the Duanwu festival. Expressions of cultural 
nationalism abounded as the furious comments made by Chinese netizens were responded by 
those in South Korea, resulting in a mutually-abusive dispute of words. After a while, the 
dispute itself faded away, but it led to a more protective stance from the Chinese and the 
Chinese government to protect and promote their cultural traditions (Park, 2010).  
As discussed above, conflicts between South Korea and China in mediascapes often 
involve cultural nationalism which spark heated debate and result in unfavorable attitudes 
and lowered esteem toward each other’s country. The promotion of the Korean wave by 
South Korea and that of the Chinese civilization by China can both be seen as a competition 
to establish a cultural standard favorable to their selves. This competition between South 
Korea and China, however, may lead to a situation which has potential to further the conflict 
and clash in mediascapes. 
 
3.3. Conflicts in Ideoscapes 
 
The most serious conflict and misunderstanding in the interaction in ideoscapes is related 
to overheated nationalism and nationalistic values found in both South Korea and China. 
China’s “Northeast (History) Project (Dongbei gongcheng)” and its complications with 
South Korea’s history of Goguryeo is a representative case. The distortion of the history of 
Goguryeo by Chinese scholars in Dongbei gongcheng and the Chinese government’s 
inappropriate response to South Korea’s remonstrance in 2004 and 2006 raised historical 
interpretation and representation as an important diplomatic issue between South Korea and 
China. There are various opinions about the intentions of China’s Dongbei gongcheng, such 
as it being a cultural expansion with the occupation of North Korean territory in mind (Lee 
and Hong, 2008) or a national attempt to integrate the ethnic minorities within China’s 
territory (Lee, H. 2008), but whatever the intention, Dongbei gongcheng worked as a critical 
trigger in turning the previously pro-Chinese Koreans against China and has been used as 
supporting evidence for the China threat in South Korea (Cho, 2010:179-180). 
Historical reconstruction is an important task for China in building and integrating the 
Chinese state, and so, the soft conflict surrounding history is expected to continue between 
South Korea and China. In particular, the results of Qingshi gongcheng (清史工程), which is 
China’s monumental work to compile the history of the Qing Dynasty, scheduled to be 
completed in 2012 in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the collapse of the Qing 
dynasty, has potential to become another ground for conflict between South Korea and China 
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when it is revealed, depending on the narration it contains on the relationship between the 
Qing Dynasty and Chosun Dynasty. This soft conflict surrounding history can be developed 
into the hard dispute if stimulated by nationalistic sentiments (Chung, 2011:313). 
China’s grand strategy following the rise of China and the pursuit of international status 
by South Korea as a “middle power” is creating another conflict in ideoscapes. It has been 
argued that, besides increases in economic and military power, the strengthening of China’s 
soft power has been pivotal in expanding the country’s remarkable increase in Asia over the 
past decade, and as such, soft power has an important place in China’s grand strategy. 
China’s strategy to increase soft power is based on the Chinese developmental model (or the 
Beijing Consensus), foreign policies (peaceful rise, peaceful development, harmonious 
world), and Chinese culture (Cho and Jeong, 2008). In order to promote its soft power 
resources, China is not only using forum diplomacy through the Boao Forum, Beijing Forum, 
Shanghai Forum, Summer Davos, and 21st Century Forum, but also exercising cultural 
diplomacy through the establishment of 358 Confucius Institutes and around 500 Confucius 
Academies in 105 countries around the world as of 2011. At present, China is putting its 
efforts on spreading the “China model” (中国模式  Zhongguo moshi), mainly targeting 
underdeveloped authoritarian countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America who aim to 
maintain their authoritarian rule while pursuing economic growth. As a result, China’s 
position and influence have grown considerably in these countries (Zhao, 2010).  
Like China, South Korea is also trying to propagate “the Korea development model” to 
third world countries. South Korea grew into a middle power through economic development 
and political democratization, and made its mark as a new player in middle power diplomacy 
by hosting the G20 meeting in 2008 (Cooper and Mo, 2011:21). In recognition of the 
growing conflict between developed countries and developing countries opening up larger 
and more significant roles to middle powers in international multilateral negotiations, South 
Korea has been pursuing a foreign policy which focuses its efforts on repositioning itself in 
the world as well as in Asia. Emphasized in these efforts are the “Korean development 
model” of the double achievement of economic development and political democratization. 
The “New Asia Design” of the Lee Myungbak administration is an exemplary strategy in this 
line, which aims to actively disseminate the Korean development model to ASEAN countries 
through the conclusion of FTAs, expansion of ODA, and strengthening of economic 
cooperation (Cho, 2010:182).  
With both South Korea and China pushing their own strategies to propagate their 
respective development models as above, the competition and conflict in ideoscapes between 
the two countries have increased considerably. This competition and conflict is expected to 





The socio-cultural relationship between South Korea and China since the normalization 
of diplomatic relationship in 1992 has shown rapid development in various facets. However, 
despite the deepened cooperation between the two countries over the past 20 years, there still 
remain serious challenges which need to be resolved to improve their bilateral relations. 
Based on Appadurai’s discussion of the transnational interaction in the globalization process, 
the present paper analyzed the socio-cultural relationship between South Korea and China 
focusing on ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes which are especially important in 




looking at socio-cultural dimensions.  
According to Appadurai, the current cultural global flows occur in and through the 
growing disjunctures among ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and 
ideoscapes (1996:37). These disjunctures are phenomena of contradiction and tension which 
occur due to the disparate courses that the global flow of people, technology, capital, image, 
and ideas take, in different speed, different origin and different destination. It is these very 
disjunctures amongst the ‘scapes’ that is intensifying the conflict and clash in the socio-
cultural relations between South Korea and China. What follows are suggestions for South 
Korea to deal with the socio-cultural clash and conflict coming from these disjunctures.  
First, South Korea should make an initiative in transnational migration diplomacy. As 
illustrated above, South Korea and China have rapidly developed mutual population 
interaction in ethnoscapes. However, this rapid flow in ethnoscapes has not been followed up 
by legal, civic, and institutional developments which balance the global flow amongst the 
five dimensions. Thus, South Korea needs to find a way to balance the rapid growth in 
ethnoscapes with the other dimensions by gradually eliminating the institutional regulations 
which prescribe illegal status to transnational migrants and limit the transnational movement 
of population. This can be done by making the initiative to lead the movement towards 
securing basic human rights for transnational migrants, and establishing a global or, at 
minimum, Asian standard for transnational migration. Through these efforts, South Korea 
will be able to gain the legitimacy to request the guarantee of human rights for its nationals 
residing in China. 
Although extending political rights to transnational migrants is difficult when nation-state 
borders are still in effect, initiatives such as eliminating discriminatory elements in the 
market will make a valid and meaningful contribution in increasing the economic rights of 
transnational migrants regardless of nation-state borders. As an institutional initiative to 
support this, South Korea can consider establishing a new administrative agency for 
immigration which integrates and unifies transnational migrant policies currently divided 
under the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Policy and Trade, and Ministry of Labor 
and so on. 
In mediascapes, South Korea should establish the Korean wave as the driving force for 
the formation of a common Asian culture. In order to do so, South Korea first needs to put 
effort in reconstructing the Korean wave as Asian public goods that go beyond the Korean 
identity. Asian countries already share a cultural affinity of which exposure to each other’s 
popular culture can renew awareness. For example, the Korean wave struck a common cord 
in Chinese people with its shared cultural background based on Confucian traditions. The 
portrayals of South Koreans in everyday life showed the Chinese that they have a lot in 
common with South Koreans and increased the feeling of familiarity. Such cultural affinity 
has been the basis for arguments made in previous literature that augmented transnational 
exchange of popular culture in Asia may lead to the formation of an Asian consciousness 
(Baek, 2005; Cho, 2005).  
To reconstruct the Korean wave into a common Asian culture, efforts needs to be made to 
create a “new Korean wave” which unearths, develops, and integrates common cultures 
shared by various Asian countries while strengthening the hold of the Korean wave, so that it 
can endure and win over emotionally charged narratives of nationalism (Jang, 2005). 
Implementing a specific strategy to respond to the anti-Korean wave in China can be a 
practical step to creating the new Korean wave. As mentioned earlier, one of the main 
reasons for the Chinese anti-Korean wave movement is the dissatisfaction with the trade 
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imbalance in cultural products between South Korea and China, which is believed by the 
Chinese to be a result of the strong push by the South Korean government. In order to bring 
balance to the cultural exchange between South Korea and China, various types of 
cooperative and collaborative cultural projects should be pursued between the two countries 
to strengthen South Korea-China relations. Some examples for these projects which have 
already been realized are Chinese domestic dramas with South Korean actors and joint and 
collaborative film productions. 
At the same time, in order to resolve the wariness felt by Chinese people about South 
Korean government’s strong drive for the promotion of its cultural product export, it is 
suggested that these efforts be made through private exchange rather than through 
government-led policies. For instance, the Korean wave together with donation diplomacy by 
private sector participation towards assisting underprivileged Chinese, in line with China’s 
efforts to build a “Harmonious Society,” can be one of the ways in which these efforts can 
take form. Through these processes, the Korean wave can create the foundation for “the new 
Korean wave” which is not just popular culture imported from South Korea but that which 
can embrace Chinese culture.  
For ideoscapes, South Korea needs pursue an “Asian Consensus” as a universal value. In 
other words, South Korea should sublimate the Seoul Consensus, based on the experience of 
economic development and political democratization together with the cultural dynamics of 
the Korean wave, to a universal Asian Consensus, and provide an alternative model to the 
essentially “Western” Washington Consensus or the Beijing Consensus which is basically a 
development state model. As a universal Asian Consensus, the Seoul Consensus will allow a 
fuller representation of the Asian experience to the development of the human civilization. 
What is most important in the formation of an Asian Consensus is the interaction of the 
intellectuals and civil society amongst Asian countries. In particular, that of intellectuals is 
particularly important because it will create a space for discourse on various socio-cultural 
elements that can later become the standard for a universal Asian culture. Despite their close 
cultural affinity, the countries in Asia have not been able to form a proper space for discourse 
due to the differences in ethnicity, religion, historical background, and language. Thus, the 
space for discourse towards forming an Asian Consensus will provide a much-awaited stage 
for opinion leaders of each country to raise their opinions and share their ideas. By creating a 
space for active and vibrant discussion amongst opinion leaders, it will be possible to move 
closer to finding a universal value for Asian culture and an Asian standard, both of which are 
necessary for the formation of an Asian Consensus. 
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